Bershadskyy, D., & Seidel, A. (2024). Choosing a victim you know: Introducing communication to the mobbing game. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 112, 102265. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SOCEC.2024.102265
In this study we investigate mobbing dynamics using a laboratory experiment based on the "mobbing game." by Abbink and Dogan (2019). We examine how communication and incremental incentives affect group coordination to target a victim. Our primary findings are:
Communication: Introducing communication reduced nomination rates (attempts to select a victim), suggesting communication may support prosocial over antisocial behavior. However, communication had no significant effect on mobbing rates (successful coordination to harm a victim).
Incentives: Incremental incentives for repeatedly targeting the same victim significantly increased both nomination and mobbing rates. This highlights the role of increasing rewards in promoting antisocial behavior.
Strategic vs. Social Communication: The study differentiated between communication before and after participants learned game rules. Strategic communication did not significantly enhance mobbing rates, possibly because social elements counteracted antisocial coordination.
Overall, while communication can reduce initial intent to mob, incentives strongly drive mobbing behavior, emphasizing the need for structural interventions in scenarios prone to antisocial coordination.